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No. 99-1908
IN
THE
SUPREME
COURT
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
JAMES
ALEXANDER,
IN
HIS
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
AS
DIRECTOR
OF
THE
ALABAMA
DEPT.
OF
PUBLIC
SAFETY
AND
ALABAMA
DEPT.
OF
PUBLIC
SAFETY,
Petitioners
v.
MARTHA
SANDOVAL,
Respondent
On
Writ of Certiorari to the
United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit
BRIEF
OF
PRO-ENGLISH,
ENGLISH
FIRST
FOUNDATION,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
UNITY,
AND
UNITED
STATES
REPRESENTATIVES
TOM
TANCREDO,
SPENCER
BACHUS,
BOB
BARR,
JOHN
DOOLITTLE,
BOB
GOODLATTE,
ERNEST
ISTOOK,
JOE
KNOLLENBERG,
WILLIAM
LIPINSKI,
CHARLIE
NORWOOD,
RON
PAUL,
BOB
RILEY,
DANA
ROHRABACHER,
NICK
SMITH
AND
BOB
STUMP
AS
AMICI
CURIAE
IN
SUPPORT
OF
PETITIONERS
BARNABY
W. ZALL
Counsel
of Record for Amici
7018 Tilden Lane
Rockville, MD 20852
(301) 231-6943
November
9, 2000
QUESTIONS
PRESENTED
Whether Congress intended
to create a private cause
of action in federal court
against a State agency that
receives federal grant funds,
thereby allowing a private
individual to enforce disparate
effect regulations promulgated
by federal agencies under
Section 602 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and bypass the
federal agency review and
enforcement process established
by Congress.
Note:
Amici
respectfully
suggest that the Question
presented above fairly includes
the following questions:
Whether a person's choice
of language can be equated,
under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, to the
person's national origin.
Whether Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 requires
a state agency, which receives
federal funds for some of
its programs, to provide all
services in any language demanded
by applicants.
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Table
of Authorities
ii [on this web page,
this section follows Conclusion]
Interest
of Amici
Curiae
1
Statement
of Context
2
Summary of Argument
9
Argument
11
I.
A
Per
Se
Rule Equating Language With
National Origin Has No Basis
in Law or Fact, and Would
Be Unworkable and Unwise
11
A. A Per
Se
Rule Equating Language and
National Origin Has No Basis
In Law or Fact 11
B.
A Per
Se
Rule Equating Language and
National Origin Is Unworkable
18
C.
A Per
Se
Rule Equating Language and
National Origin Is Unwise
21
II.
Federal Rules Which Affect
Core Rights of the States
to Choose English for Internal
Operations Must Be Explicit
23
Conclusion
26
INTEREST
OF
AMICI
CURIAE
There are several amici curiae
participating in this brief.
Counsel for all parties have
consented to the filing of
this brief.
Pro-English (formerly known
as English Language Advocates)
is a non-profit advocacy organization
dedicated to the preservation
and promotion of a common
language - English - in American
political and governmental
life. Pro-English is an unincorporated
project of U.S., Inc., of
Petoskey, Michigan, a non-profit
charitable and educational
corporation. Pro-English and
its President, Robert D. Park,
have been the principal advocates
for "official English" policies
before the federal courts,
including in Arizonans
for Official English and Robert
D. Park v. Arizona,
Nos. 95-974 and 98-167.
English First Foundation ("EFF")
is a national, non-profit
charitable organization which
studies the significance of
the use of English in the
United States and educates
the public about the importance
of preserving English as the
common language of the United
States. EFF conducts research,
educational programs, seminars
and conferences, and provides
legal counseling and assistance.
EFF was an amicus
curiae
in Nos. 98-404 and 98-564,
U.S.
Dept. of Commerce v. U.S.
House of Representatives,
and
Clinton
v. Glavin.
The Center for American Unity
("CAU") is a national non-profit
charitable and educational
organization dedicated to
preserving our historical
unity as Americans into the
21st Century. CAU's education
program emphasizes that America's
common language, English,
is the basic bond uniting
and strengthening the United
States.
Cong. Tom Tancredo, a United
States Representative from
the Sixth District of Colorado,
sits on the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, which
has jurisdiction over the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, discussed at length
herein. Cong. Tancredo sent
and received the letters reprinted
in the Appendix to this brief.
Cong. Spencer Bachus, Bob
Barr, John Doolittle, Bob
Goodlatte, Ernest Istook,
Joe Knollenberg, William Lipinski,
Charlie Norwood, Ron Paul,
Bob Riley, Dana Rohrabacher,
Nick Smith, and Bob Stump
are United States Representatives
from Alabama, Georgia, California,
Virginia, Oklahoma, Michigan,
Illinois, Georgia, Texas,
Alabama, California, Michigan,
and Arizona, respectively.
At its heart, this case is
about whether a person's choice
of language can be equated
to the person's national origin.
Amici are
deeply concerned about the
effect of equating language
and national origin. Amici
are involved in efforts to
promote the use of English
as the language of government,
and amici
believe
that equating language and
national origin will both
stop governments from requiring
the use of English and force
governments to provide services
in languages other than English.
Such an equation of language
and national origin could
have a substantial impact
on amici's
activities.
STATEMENT
OF CONTEXT
This is the third time in
the last ten years that this
Court has reviewed cases involving
government's choice of language
for internal operations: Hernandez
v. New York,
500 U.S. 352 (1991), No. 89-7645;
Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 34 (1997), No. 95-974;
and this case. Though this
Court vacated Gutierrez,
Judge
Reinhardt considers the vacated
opinion to still "represent
the thinking" of the Ninth
Circuit. Garcia
v. Spun Steak,
13 F.3d 296, 301 (9th
Cir. 1994)(Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from denial of
reh'g en
banc).
So do Respondents, Pet. App.
238a (District Court quoting
plaintiffs), and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
Amici App. 19A, n. 5 ("the
validity of the case's reasoning
was not affected because it
was vacated on the ground
of mootness.").
This Court last looked at
language-related issues in
AOE
v. Arizona,
No. 95-974. At that time,
the briefs of the parties
and amici
described current political
battles on the federal level,
including Congressional considerations
of legislation to declare
English the official language
of the United States, to reform
bilingual ballots and to eliminate
bilingual education. In the
intervening years, there has
been relatively little Congressional
activity on language-related
questions, but enormous changes
have occurred elsewhere, especially
in the area of bilingual education.
In 1998, for example, California
voters overwhelmingly adopted
Proposition 227, an initiative
driven by parents of limited-English
proficiency ("LEP") children
who wanted their kids to learn
English. Steinberg, "Increase
in Test Scores Counters Dire
Forecasts for Bilingual Ban,"
The
New York Times,
August 20, 2000, P. A1. The
initiative, known as "English
for the Children," eliminated
most existing bilingual education
programs, which taught children
in their native languages
("native language instruction").
The English for the Children
initiative substituted an
intensive program of English
language instruction, teaching
the children English by teaching
them in English. Id.
Two school years later, test
scores indicate that teaching
the children in English was
a smashing success. Test scores
in most school districts jumped
dramatically. Id.
In second grade, for example,
the average score in reading
of a student classified as
limited in English increased
9 percentage points over the
last two years, to the 28th
percentile from the 19th
percentile in national rankings,
according to the state. In
mathematics, the increase
in the average score for the
same students was 14 points,
to the 41st percentile
from the 27th.
Id.
One of the principal backers
of the prior method of "native
language instruction" was
Oceanside, Calif., Superintendent
of Schools Ken Noonan, a founder
of the California Association
of Bilingual Education. Noonan,
"I Believed That Bilingual
Education Was Best . . Until
the Kids Proved Me Wrong,"
The Washington Post,
September 3, 2000, B1. Noonan
fought Proposal 227, but when
the voters passed it, he led
Oceanside School District
into strict compliance with
the new law's requirements.
Id.
The results: Oceanside's test
scores improved by 19 percentage
points since implementation
of the new law. Id.
"I thought it would hurt kids,"
Mr. Noonan said of the ballot
initiative, which was called
Proposition 227. "The exact
reverse occurred, totally
unexpected by me. The kids
began to learn - not pick
up but learn - formal English,
oral and written, far more
quickly than I ever thought
they would."
Steinberg, supra.
And the increase can be attributed
to the new English immersion
form of education:
Oceanside's performance was
all the more striking when
measured against the nearby
district of Vista, where half
the limited English speakers
. . . continued in bilingual
classes. In nearly every grade,
the increases in Oceanside
were at least double those
in Vista, which is similar
in size and economic background
to Oceanside. Id.
The success of California's
elimination of bilingual education
is spurring similar efforts
in Arizona, Colorado, Massachusetts,
New York and other states.
Id.
In Connecticut, a new law
offers English instruction
and parental choice opportunities
similar to those in the California
initiative. Pub. Act 99-121,
"An Act Improving Bilingual
Education," http://www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/act/pa/1999pa-00211-r00sb-01083-pa.htm.
At the same time, however,
federal agencies are mounting
an aggressive attack on English-language
policies and programs. After
hearing about the Oceanside
School District's success,
the federal Department of
Education challenged Oceanside's
implementation of the new
English-language instructional
techniques. Diehl, "O'side
district ripped over bilingual
ed," North
County Times,
Oct. 3, 2000, front page,
reprinted
at
http://www.onenation.org/0010/100300b.html
(reporting on joint investigation
between federal and state
departments of education);
Diehl, "Prop. 227 author criticizes
investigation of O'side district,"
North
County Times,
October 4, 2000, reprinted
at
http://www.onenation.org/0010/100400c.html
("The district could not document
that they follow their own
policies and procedures").
Similarly, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission is
steadily increasing its attacks
on employers who wish their
employees to speak English
on the job. The EEOC has promulgated
a rule which presumes that
an employer's rule requiring
English in the workplace is
national origin discrimination.
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7. The EEOC
reports that in 1996, it reviewed
77 national-origin discrimination
challenges to workplace language
rules. U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, "Court
Speaks: English Only Rule
Unlawful," Press Release,
Sept. 19, 2000, www.eeoc.gov/press/9-19-99.html.
That number jumped to 253
in 1999, and 355 by September
of this year. Id.
As shown in more detail below,
virtually every federal court
which has considered the issue
has rejected the EEOC's interpretation.
For example, the Ninth Circuit
recently rejected the EEOC
policy as ultra
vires.
Garcia
v. Spun Steak,
998 F.2d 1480, 1489-90 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert.
denied,
512 U.S. 1228 (1994) (upholding
English-language workplace
rule to stop workers from
hurling racial insults at
co-workers).
Yet a recent exchange of letters
with Amicus Cong. Tom Tancredo,
attached
as an Appendix ("Amici App."),
indicates that the EEOC is
continuing to enforce its
policy, even in jurisdictions
which have rejected its interpretation.
Two dozen charges were resolved
between August 1998 and August
1999. Amici App. 22A - 24A.
Some of the charges were filed
in appellate circuits which
had rejected the guidelines.
Amici App. 23A. The EEOC explains:
"EEOC offices in a jurisdiction
that has issued a decision
contrary to the guidelines
continue to conduct the administrative
process pursuant to the guidelines.
. . . Of course the EEOC would
not file a suit to enforce
the guidelines if such suit
has been precluded by governing
circuit law." Amici App. 23A
- 24A. .
Building on the decision below
and on the EEOC's new enforcement
effort, the Administration
issued Executive Order No.
13,166 (Aug. 11, 2000). Executive
Order 13,166 makes the same
equation of language and national
origin that the lower court
did in this case. Executive
Order 13,166 requires federal
agencies to "provide meaningful
access . . . to ensure that
the programs and activities
they normally provide in English
are accessible to LEP [Limited
English Proficient] persons
and thus
do not discriminate on the
basis of national origin."
Supp. App. 11a, (emphasis
added).
Executive Order 13,166 requires
federal agency programs to
be approved under and be subject
to the Department of Justice's
new Policy Guidance on assistance
to LEP persons. Supp. App.
12a. The Justice Department's
Policy Guidance similarly
equates language and national
origin, relying in part on
the decision below. Supp.
App. 19a, 21a. The Policy
Guidance expands this equation
to federal grantees. "Recipients
who fail to provide services
to LEP applicants and beneficiaries
in their federally assisted
programs and activities may
be discriminating on the basis
of national origin in violation
of Title VI and its implementing
regulations." Supp. App. 23a.
In addition, because of the
use of Title VI definitions
of national origin in Title
VII and IX cases, this equation
of language and national origin
will be applied in private
employment cases, and perhaps
other areas as well.
Under Executive Order 13,166
and the Justice Department
Policy Guidance, it is not
enough to be neutral about
language. To avoid a charge
of national origin discrimination,
an agency, grantee or employer
must affirmatively provide
language assistance. Supp.
App. 23a - 27a.
Though the extent of assistance
is supposed to be determined
by a variety of factors, at
a minimum, the agency, grantee
or employer must provide at
least oral translation services
if only one person requests
it. Supp. App. 23a. The Policy
Guidance requires, in most
cases, at least the use of
"one of the commercially available
language lines to obtain immediate
interpreter services." Supp.
App. 24a. Though not stated,
apparently the cost of such
services, which can be as
high as $4.50 per minute plus
"set-up" fees, is to be borne
by the agency, grantee or
employer subject to a potential
charge of national origin
discrimination.
Thus, at the same time that
States are actively using
more effective means to bring
persons who do not speak English
into the educational and social
mainstream, the Executive
Branch is using the decision
below to impair just those
successful efforts. The Executive
Branch, without any authorization
by Congress or the courts,
has equated language and national
origin in a manner which will
cause enormous amounts of
litigation, and will stifle
promising efforts to teach
English to those who could
benefit so much.
SUMMARY
OF ARGUMENT
The crux of this dispute is
the equation of a person's
choice of language to the
person's national origin.
To have a private right of
action, as asserted here,
a claimant must come within
one of the recognized Title
VI classes; the class at issue
in this case is "national
origin." Here no particular
language was singled out as
a proxy for discrimination
against a protected class,
thus the question is whether
a choice of using English
(as opposed to choosing to
use languages other than English)
is national origin discrimination.
The answer must be no. Equating
a person's language with the
person's national origin has
no basis in law or fact. There
is no statutory language or
legislative history in the
civil rights laws which suggests
such an equation.
Nor is there any judicial
decision which finds such
an equation in the civil rights
laws. Though there have been
some suggestions that language
rules may be proxies for otherwise
hidden national origin discrimination,
the vast majority of decisions
have rejected the equation
of language and national origin
without more.
There are some administrative
interpretations which equate
language choice to national
origin. These interpretations,
however, do not bind this
Court. In addition, courts
have overwhelmingly rejected
those interpretations.
The equation of language to
national origin also has no
basis in fact, and would be
both over- and under-inclusive.
Spanish, for example, is the
official language of at least
13 countries, impairing a
determination of a speaker's
ancestry. Many Hispanic-Americans
do not speak Spanish, and
many non-Hispanic-Americans
do.
In addition, equating language
and national origin would
be unworkable. This is not
a case about English vs. Spanish,
but about English vs. hundreds
of languages. The courts have
repeatedly recognized the
tremendous burdens of translating
hundreds of languages and
refused to impose such burdens.
Finally, equating language
and national origin would
be unwise. Any recognition
by the Court of such an equation
would affect dozens of settled
decisions, sparking an enormous
number of new claims of discrimination
in government, contracting,
employment, housing and other
areas.
Any such equation of language
and national origin would
affect "original power" core
functions of States. Choice
of language for internal functions
has historically been left
to the States. Federal intervention
on language choice over a
vast sweep of State programs
will weaken the States' powers.
The statutory or constitutional
authority for any such intervention
should be explicit. Absent
a clear and explicit abrogation
of those State powers, the
States should be left to decide
- through their own political
processes - which language
burdens to accept. There is
no such clear and explicit
abrogation of State power
for the language choices in
this case.
The decision below should
be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.
A
Per
Se
Rule Equating Language
With National Origin Has
No Basis in Law or Fact,
and Would Be Unworkable
and Unwise.
The decision below equates
language and national
origin. Sandoval
v. Hagan,
197 F.3d 484, 508-09 (11th
Cir. 1999); see,
Pet. App. 22a-29a. Such
a novel per
se
equation of language choice
and national origin has
no basis in law or fact,
and would be unworkable
and unwise.
A.
A Per
Se
Rule Equating Language
and National Origin Has
No Basis In Law or Fact.
1.
A Per
Se
Rule Equating Language
and National Origin Has
No Basis in Law.
The language, history
and interpretations of
the Fourteenth Amendment
and other federal laws
do not support equating,
per
se,
language and national
origin.
Statutory
Language:
"[T]he reach of
Title VI's protection
extends no further than
the Fourteenth Amendment."
United
States v. Fordice,
505 U.S. 717, 732 n. 7
(1992)(citations omitted).
The Fourteenth Amendment
does not include the phrase
"national origin." Nevertheless,
discrimination on the
basis of ancestry violates
the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
St.
Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604, 614 n. 5
(1987). "Distinctions
between citizens solely
because of their ancestry
are by their very nature
odious to free people
whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine
of equality." Hirabayashi
v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
No federal statute defines
"national origin." Title
VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 added "national
origin," without definition,
to the list of protected
classes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,
Pub. L. 88-352, Title
VI, § 601, July 2, 1964,
78 Stat. 252.
Legislative
History:
Legislative history does
not support a language-based
definition of national
origin. This Court has
noted that the legislative
history concerning the
meaning of national origin,
even under statutory law,
is "quite meager." Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).
Nevertheless, "[t]he
terms 'national origin'
and 'ancestry' were considered
synonymous." 414 U.S.
at 89. During debate on
the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, Representative Roosevelt
stated: "May I just make
very clear that 'national
origin' means national.
It means the country from
which you or your forebears
came from. You may come
from Poland, Czechoslovakia,
England, France, or any
other country." 110 CONG.
REC.
2,549 (1964).
This Court supports that
assessment: "[t]he
term 'national origin'
on its face refers to
the country where a person
was born, or, more broadly,
the country from which
his or her ancestors came."
Espinoza,
414 U.S. at 88; see
also, Pejic v. Hughes
Helicopters,
840 F.2d 667, 672-73 (9th
Cir. 1988)(persons of
Serbian national origin
are members of a protected
class under Title VII).
Administrative
Interpretations:
As noted above, there
are now three administrative
interpretations which
equate language and national
origin. The oldest is
the EEOC's presumption
against requiring the
use of English on the
job. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7.
The newest are the interlocked
Executive Order 13,166
(August 11, 2000) (reprinted
in Supp. App. 10a - 13a),
and the Justice Department's
Policy Guidance on National
Origin Discrimination
Against Persons With Limited
English Proficiency (reprinted
in Supp. App. 14a - 28a).
This Court has never reviewed
those administrative interpretations,
and they do not bind this
Court. Espinoza,
414 U.S. at 94-95.
Numerous other courts
have reviewed the EEOC
Guidelines and have rejected
them and their underlying
equation of language and
national origin.
See,
e.g.,
Garcia
v. Spun-Steak,
998 F.2d 1480, 1489-90
(9th Cir. 1993),
cert.
den.
512 U.S. 1228 (1994)(EEOC
Guidelines equating language
and national origin were
ultra
vires);
Vasquez
v. McAllen Bag & Supply
Co.,
660 F.2d 686 (5th
Cir. 1981)(upholding English-on-the-job
rule for non-English-speaking
truck drivers); Garcia
v. Rush-Presbyterian St.
Luke's Medical Center,
660 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th
Cir. 1981)(upholding hiring
practices requiring English
proficiency); Long
v. First Union Corp.,
894 F.Supp. 933, 941 (E.D.
Virginia, 1995 ("there
is nothing in Title VII
which protects or provides
that an employee has a
right to speak his or
her native tongue while
on the job."), affirmed,
86 F.3d 1151 (4th
Cir. 1996).
Judicial
Interpretations:
As the lower court recognized,
197 F.3d at 509 n. 26,
this Court has never held
that the language a person
chooses to speak can be
equated to the person's
national origin. Though
this issue was briefed
and discussed in
Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352 (1991), the
Court did not make a holding
on this question. "Petitioner
argues that Spanish-language
ability bears a close
relation to ethnicity,
and that, as a result,
it violates the Equal
Protection Clause. . .
We need not address that
argument here." 500 U.S.
at 360.
The Circuits, on the other
hand, have rejected such
an equation. See,
e.g.,
Soberal-Perez
v. Heckler,
717 F.2d at 41:
A classification is implicitly
made, but it is on the
basis of language, i.e.,
English-speaking versus
non-English-speaking individuals,
and not on the basis of
race, religion or national
origin. Language, by itself,
does not identify members
of a suspect class.
See,
also,
Toure
v. United States,
24 F.3d at 446 (affirming
Soberal-Perez
and rejecting request
for multilingual forfeiture
notices). "A policy involving
an English requirement,
without more, does not
establish discrimination
based on race or national
origin." An
v. General Am. Life Ins.
Co.,
872 F.2d 426 (9th
Cir. 1989)(table).
A few cases indicate that
if the language policy
is a pretext for intentional
discrimination, a language-related
rule might violate national
origin rules. In addition,
two recent lower court
decisions have adopted
the EEOC's interpretation
equating language and
national origin.
See,
e.g.,
EEOC
v. Synchro-Start Products,
29 F.Supp.2d 911, 915
n. 10 (N.D. Illinois,
1999)(on advice of law
clerk, Judge Shadur was
"staking out a legal position
that has not been espoused
by any appellate court.");
EEOC
v. Premier Operator Services,
113 F.Supp.2d 1066 (N.D.
Texas, 2000)(Magistrate
Judge Stickney,
rejecting appellate cases
against EEOC Guidelines
and relying on Synchro-Start
Products
and Judge Reinhardt's
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